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parties. Price v. Jones, 105 Ind. 543, 55 Am. Rep. 230 (1885). It is not necessary
that the consideration for the note be equal in pecuniary value to the obligation
incurred; if no part of the consideration was wanting at the time, and no part
of it subsequently failed, even though inadequate in amount, the note is a valid
obligation. Earl v. Peck, 64 N.Y. 596 (1876). Failure of consideration implies
something more than mere inadequacy. Failure of consideration may mean either
total worthlessness to all parties or subsequent destruction, either partial or com-
plete. See Cowell v. Cornell, 75 N.Y. 91, 31 Am. Rep. 428 (1878). Mere inade-
quacy of consideration would not be enough to defeat recovery. See Rust v. Fitz-
hugh, 132 Wis. 549, 112 N.W. 508 (1907). Some things are sufficient to support a
promise on negotiable paper which are not sufficient consideration for other prom-
ises. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 108. When a party gets all the considera-
tion he has honestly contracted for, he cannot say that he gets no consideration,
or that it has failed. If this doctrine be not correct, then it is not true that par-
ties are at liberty to make their own contracts. Williamson v. Hintner, 79 Ind.
233 (1881). There are two apparent exceptions to the proposition that a court
will not interfere with the parties' judgment: first, where the sole consideration
is money and the amount is greatly disproportionate to the promise; second,
where fraud in the procurement is shown. Wolford v. Powers, 85 Ind. 294, 44
Am. Rep. 16 (1882). Even then fraud and not inadequacy is the true and only
cause for granting relief. POMEROY, EQUITY (2nd Ed. 1882) § 927. It would
seem therefore, that in cases of this kind where personal services are rendered,
the courts will enforce the contracts regardless of seeming differences between
the value of such services and the amount of the notes. It is to be expected that,
where the maker is old and infirm the courts will scrutinize the facts of the
transaction with care.
OLIVER H. BASSUENER.
BILLS AND NOTEs-CHECKS-PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT-REASONABLE TIME.
-The plaintiff sued to recover the price of goods sold on account. The
defendant pleaded payment by check and failure by plaintiff to make presentation
within a reasonable time. The check was drawn on a Kenosha bank and was
sent to the payee at Chicago. The payee sent the check for clearance through its
depository bank in Minneapolis, and that bank forwarded the check to the
Federal Reserve Bank at Chicago, which in turn forwarded it to the drawee
bank, where it arrived one day after the latter bank was closed. The plaintiff
showed that some twenty previous checks of the defendant had been sent to its
depository bank in the same manner. The lower court found that this check had
been cleared within a resonable time. On appeal, Held, judgment reversed and
remanded; the route used by the payee in forwarding the check to the drawee
bank resulted in an unnecessary delay of one day. The drawer was discharged
from liability to the extent of the loss caused by the delay. Mars, Inc. v. Chubrilo,
(Wis. 1934) 257 N.W. 157.
The general rule as provided in the Negotiable Instruments Law is that a
check must be presented for payment within a reasonable time after it is is-
sued. Wis. Stat. (1933) § 118.62. If it is not presented within a reasonable time,
and the bank fails the drawer will be discharged from liability to the extent of
the loss. This results from the nature of the instrument, which, though defined
in the Negotiable Instruments Law as "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank pay-
able on demand," is intended for immediate payment and not for circulation.
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Wis. Stat. (1933) § 118.61; Cf. Gifford v. Hardell, 88 Wis. 538, 60 N.W. 1064,
43 Am. St. Rep. 925 (1894). What is a reasonable or an unreasonable time de-
pends on the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade or business, (if any)
with respect to such instruments and the facts of the particular case. Wis. Stat.
(1933) § 116.01.
Where the payee and the drawee bank are in the same community, in the
absence of special circumstances, it is generally held that the payee has until
the close of the next business day in which to present the check for payment.
Nat. Plumbing and Heating Supply Co. v. Stephenson, 203 II. App. 49 (1918) ;
Aebi v. Bank of Evansville, 124 Wis. 73, 102 N.W. 329, 109 Am. St. Rep. 925,
68 L.R.A. 964 (1905). The fact that the check was given on a legal holiday
does not change the above rule. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. H. M. Brown Coal
Co., 226 Mo. App. 1038, 48 S.W. (2nd) 86 (1932). Where the check is post dated,
it becomes an ordinary check on its date and payable on demand within a rea-
sonable time after date. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Hayworth, 296 Fed. 339
(C.C.A. 4th, 1924); (1924) 24 Col. L. Rev. 919. Where the check is received
after banking hours, that day is not counted since no deposit on presentment can
be made after banking hours. Bistline v. Benting, 39 Idaho 534, 228 Pac. 309
(1924).
Where the payee and the drawee bank are not in the same community, and in
the absence of special circumstances, the check must be forwarded for present-
ment on the next secular day after it has been received, and the agent to whom
it is forwarded must present it for payment on the next secular day after receiv-
ing it. Gifford v. Hardell, supra. The payee is not required to forward the check
by the first mail on the next day after receipt but it is sufficient if the check is
forwarded by the last mail on the day after receipt. Lloyd v. Osborne, 92 Wis. 93,
65 N.W. 859 (1896). The fact that the bank on which a check is drawn is not a
member of the local clearing house does not change the general rules of law as
to the time within which a check must be presented in order to hold the drawer
liable thereon. Lowell Cooperative Bank v. T. F. Sheridan Apt., (Mass. 1934)
188 N.E. 636. Forwarding a check by a circuitous route may, as a general rule,
be said to constitute negligence, except where the check reaches its destination as
soon as if sent directly to the bank. Northern Lwrnber Co. v. Clausen, 201 Iowa
701, 208 N.W. 72 (1926); Plover Savings Bank v. Moodie, 135 Iowa 685, 110
N.W. 29, 113 N.W. 476 (1907).
The instant case holds that the payee is not excused from presenting the
check within a reasonable time where he sends a check on a circuitous route,
although it has been the custom of business houses in the community where the
payee does business to present checks through depository banks in different
towns; nor can he be excused by showing that it has been accustomed to pre-
sent the maker's checks through such a depository bank when the maker does
not know of such presentation.
WILui F. HURnEY.
BILLS AND NoTEs-HoLDEs Wrriaour NoncE.-The defendant company
made and recorded a deed of trust to the trustee to secure the defendant's bonds
given in return for a loan. The bonds, bearer instruments, stated on their face
that they were secured by a deed of trust "to which * * * reference is hereby
made with the same effect as though recited at length herein * * * for the pur-
pose of affecting the rights of the holders of the bonds, and the terms and
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